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Table 2. Evaluations of the Civil Code
*DonÕt know/No answer
1 0 04 . 24 5 . 35 0 . 5T o t a l
D K / N A *
Religious wedding
should also be legal
Present application
should continue
In Turkey only the civil wedding is legally accepted but those who wish may go through a religious
ceremony (imam wedding). Would you approve of having a religious wedding as legally valid or should
t h e present regulations continue?
1 0 07 . 57 8 . 51 4 . 0T o t a l
D K / N A *
Would not accept changing the
present Civil C o d e
Would accept changing
t h e present Civil C o d e
According to Islamic law a man can divorce his wife without going before a judge. However, according
t o the present Civil Code, divorce requires a court case and a judgeÕs decision. Would you accept changing
t h e present Civil Code so as to allow divorces to be regulated according to Islamic law?
1 0 04 . 78 1 . 41 3 . 9T o t a l
D K / N A *
Would not accept changing
t h e present Civil C o d e
Would accept changing
the present Civil C o d e
According to Islamic law women receive a smaller share of their parentÕs inheritance. However, according
t o the present Civil Code both men and women get an equal share from inheritance. Would you accept
changing the Civil Code so as to give men the right to obtain a larger share of the inheritance than women?
1 0 04 . 38 5 . 01 0 . 7T o t a l
D K / N A *
Does not approve of marriage
according to Islamic law
Approves of marriage according
to Islamic law
According to Islamic law a man is allowed to be married to up to four women. However, at present
polygamy is outlawed. Would you approve of changing the system of marriage in accordance with Islamic
law, so as to allow the marriage of men with up to four women?
T u r k e y
A L I   A R K O ùG L U
Despite the centrality of the rising tensions between
secularist and pro-Islamist groups with respect to the
future of Turkish politics, little empirical analysis ex-
ists on the cleavages between the two groups. The Po-
litical Islam in Turkey (PIT) project* provides extensive
opportunities for such an analysis as well as analyses
of many other aspects of Islam in modern Turkey. The
following focuses on the levels of support for the con-
troversial policies in recent years aimed at regulating
the role of religion in Turkish social life.
Religion and Public
Policy in Turkey
Several memorable incidents occurred during
the establishment of the secular Republican
regime and its immediate aftermath in which
the reactionary peripheral forces gathered
around a loud reactionary demand for üseriat
and the protection of the sultanate and
caliphate. Tension between the secularists and
pro-Islamist forces resurfaced with the success
of the pro-Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi),
first in the local elections of 1994 and then in
the general elections of 1995. Ever since, ques-
tions concerning the popular bases of üseriat
rule have been used in public opinion surveys.
The wording of the questions usually refers to
an unspecified group of people that suppos-
edly think that Turkey should be governed ac-
cording to üseriat rules. The respondents are
asked whether they would agree with this
idea. These simplistic evaluations cannot be
taken as a reflection of a demand for üseriat rule.
Perhaps more seriously, the respondents are
not even given a description of what is meant
by üseriat, nor are they asked about specific im-
plications of üseriat rules.
Table 1 shows the findings in three consecu-
tive opinion polls conducted in 1995, 1996 and
1998. What is striking in these figures is that
over the years concerned at least one out of
five voters expressed their approval of üseriat
rule in Turkey. A year before the peak of ten-
sions between the military and the pro-Is-
lamists during the so-called Ô28th of February
processÕ, the approval rate peaked with slight-
ly more than 25% of the voters supporting the
idea. Nearly a year after the start of the
ÔprocessÕ the approval rate dropped to its 1995
level.
The straightforward wording of the question
used in the PIT stressed the necessity of the es-
tablishment of üseriat rule: ÔWould you or would
you not favour the establishment of a üseriat-
based religious state in Turkey?Õ Answers to
this question in February 1999 indicate that
approximately 21% of the voters approve.
Several additional questions (Table 2) in the
PIT concerning the Civic Code could be used to
provide some content to the above findings.
When posing these questions on the present-
day Civic Code regulations on marriage, di-
vorce and inheritance, the wording specifically
allowed for a clear comparison with arrange-
ments in accordance to the Islamic law.
The overwhelming support for the secular Re-
publican Civic Code is evidence of the prob-
lematic nature of the word üseriat for the Turk-
ish electorate. A significant number of the
ship (practice) requirements of Islam. Those
who indicated that people in Turkey are not
free to fulfil these requirements totalled
nearly 31%. People were also asked whether
religious people are oppressed in Turkey.
Compared to the question concerning the
freedom to fulfil requirements, those who
believed that oppression exists with respect
to religious people is higher Ð at approxi-
mately 42%.
Those who indicated that oppression of
religious people exists in Turkey were also
asked in an open-ended question to provide
examples of this oppression. Of the 1,254 re-
spondents who indicated that oppression
exists towards the religious people, 812 Ð or
nearly 64% Ð gave an example related to
banning of headscarves or the turban. Inter-
estingly, the closure of Imam Hatip schools
and QurÕanic courses constitute the second
largest group of examples, which were
given by about 13% of the respondents. In
short, examples of policies that are directly
related to oppression in the perceptions of
the people are primarily related to educa-
tion policies. These examples were evoked
by 77% of respondents who claim that reli-
gious people are being oppressed in Turkey.
The very low number of examples for op-
pression of religious people that included
oppression of worship practices such as
daily prayers (n a m a z), fasting and the like is
also worth noting. Similarly, very few an-
swers note oppression targeted at the Alevi
community. Despite Turkish mediaÕs intense
coverage of the closure and prosecution of
Islamic brotherhoods (t a r i k a t s), answers in-
dicating this comprised only about 1% of all
examples given. Surprisingly, the military
appears only in a total of 33 answers as an
example. Clearly, within the context of an
open-ended question about oppression of
religious people, the military does not re-
ceive much blame.
electorate seems unable to refute üseriat rule.
However, as Table 2 shows,once given a clear
choice between the secular and Islamic legal
arrangements, preferences clearly shift to-
ward the secular arrangements.
An integral part of the Republican civic law
was the abolishment of religious ceremonies
or clerical marriages (imam nikahõ). Under the
Republican arrangement the only lawful mar-
riage is civil marriage. However, it is well
known that a sizeable proportion of the cou-
ples that marry in a civil ceremony also under-
go a religious ceremony in which an imam
concludes the marriage contract. When asked
whether the religious wedding with an imam
and the civil marriage ceremony should both
be counted as official, nearly 45% of the re-
spondents answered favourably to having
both become legally binding.
Table 3 presents answers in support of
some assertions concerning the role of reli-
gion in Turkish society and general evalua-
tions of the social and political life of the
country. It seems that nearly three quarters of
the respondents support assertions about
women having the right to cover their heads
if they want to in the universities as well as in
government jobs. Other statements about re-
ligious expression in social life were strongly
supported. However, despite overwhelming
agreement with statements backing a reli-
gious point of view, nearly 67% agree with
the statement that having religion as a guide
in state affairs is detrimental. Could these
agreements be taken as a disguised support
for secular principles? The fact that those who
agree with this statement seem very unlikely
to support üseriat rule seems to support this
view. Similarly, nearly 77% of the respondents
agree with the statement that Republican re-
forms have helped Turkey to progress.
Recently the role of the Directorate of Reli-
gious Affairs (Diyanet I
.
üsleri Baüskanlõ ùgõ) in regu-
lating the role of religion in Turkish society
has come under attack. Despite its large bud-
get, the DirectorateÕs services concentrate
Table 1. Approval of üs e r i a t r u l e
June 1995 March 1996 May 1998
A p p r o v e s 1 9 . 9 2 6 . 7 1 9 . 8
Does not approve 6 1 . 8 5 8 . 1 5 9 . 9
DonÕt Know/No Opinion 1 8 . 4 1 5 . 2 2 0 . 2
Source: TSES (1999, 68Ð69)
Would you favour the establishment of a üs e r i a t-based religious state in Turkey? 
W o u l d Would not D K / N A *
f a v o u r f a v o u r
T o t a l 2 1 . 0 6 7 . 9 1 1 . 1 1 0 0
Source: arko ùglu and Toprak (2000, p. 16) *DonÕt know/No answer
primarily on Sunni rather than Alevi commu-
nities. Nonetheless, the harsh reactions to the
Directorate do not seem to find much sup-
port among the population at large; only
about 8% seem to support the idea of aboli-
tion of the Directorate. But when it comes to
the functions it fulfils the reformists dominate
the answers: nearly 70% of the respondents
agree with the statement that the Directorate
should provide services to the Alevi as well as
the Sunni communities.
Another facet of state-society relations in
Turkey concerning religiosity, religious ser-
vices and worship practices is an implicit
concern, or explicit claim, that religious peo-
ple are being oppressed. Although some
state policies are not fully supported by the
people, it is not clear whether these policies
are perceived to be oppressive.
The PIT includes a question as to whether
people in Turkey are free to fulfil the wor-
N o t e
* Carried out by myself and Binnaz Toprak
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Table 3. Approval of various assertions
A g r e e U n d e c i d e d D i s a g r e e D K / N A *
All Muslim women should cover their heads. 5 8 . 9 6 . 4 3 2 . 6 2 . 1
I donÕt approve of teenage boys and girls being
educated together in the same classroom. 3 8 . 5 6 . 8 5 1 . 9 2 . 7
I donÕt approve of girls and young women wearing
short skirts. 5 7 . 1 8 . 8 3 1 . 6 2 . 5
Women state employees should be allowed to cover
their heads if they want to. 7 4 . 2 5 . 8 1 7 . 4 2 . 5
Girls should be allowed to cover their heads in
the universities if they want to. 7 6 . 1 5 . 6 1 6 . 0 2 . 3
I donÕt approve of men and women sitting next
to one another in inter-city bus travel. 6 0 . 2 7 . 1 3 0 . 7 1 . 9
Selling of alcohol during the month of Ramadan
should be banned. 7 0 . 5 5 . 4 2 2 . 3 1 . 8
Religious guidance in state affairs and politics
is detrimental. 6 7 . 2 9 . 5 1 6 . 4 6 . 9
Work hours should be arranged according to Friday prayer. 6 6 . 4 7 . 5 2 2 . 2 3 . 9
Earning interest from money invested in banks is a sin. 6 2 . 6 6 . 1 2 8 . 1 3 . 2
Republican reforms have advanced this country. 7 7 . 3 9 . 0 8 . 3 5 . 4
Source: arko ùglu and Toprak (2000, p. 59) *DonÕt know/No answer
